

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION

MARC WAYNE HOLLIDAY,	)	
AIS #257141,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-CV-535-MHT
	)	(WO)
	)	
DAVID KARN, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by Marc Wayne Holliday, an indigent state inmate currently serving a twenty-year sentence for second degree sodomy imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Chilton County, Alabama. In this complaint, Holliday complains that he received ineffective assistance at his resentencing and challenges the constitutionality of the sodomy conviction on which he is currently incarcerated. Doc. 1 at 2-3.<sup>1</sup> Holliday names Sibley Reynolds, the judge who presided over his state criminal proceedings, and David Karn, the attorney appointed

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<sup>1</sup>The entries on Holliday's case action summary sheet maintained by the Alabama Trial Court System, hosted at [www.alacourt.com](http://www.alacourt.com), establish the date of Holliday's guilty plea for second degree sodomy as September 17, 2007 and further demonstrate that Judge Reynolds issued the last sentencing order in such case on March 10, 2011. In this sentencing order, Judge Reynolds corrected the second degree sodomy sentence to reflect that it is not subject to enhancement under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, Ala. Code § 13A-5-9, and again sentenced Holliday to twenty years imprisonment for this conviction. Judge Reynolds reduced the remaining felony sentence imposed upon Holliday for first degree sexual abuse from twenty to ten years. The court takes judicial notice of this case action summary. *Keith v. DeKalb Cty.*, 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014).

to represent him at resentencing, as defendants in this cause of action. Holliday seeks a reversal of his sodomy conviction and expungement of all records regarding this conviction. Doc. 1 at 4.

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that this case is due to be summarily dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).<sup>2</sup>

## **II. DISCUSSION**

### **A. Judge Sibley Reynolds**

Holliday alleges that Judge Sibley Reynolds violated his constitutional rights with respect to the second degree sodomy conviction entered against him pursuant to his guilty plea on September 17, 2007 and during sentencing proceedings related to his resentencing on March 10, 2011. Doc. 1 at 3. The claims against Judge Reynolds entitle Holliday to no relief in this cause of action.

In his complaint, Holliday seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from his second degree sodomy conviction and the final sentencing order issued by Judge Reynolds. This court, however, lacks jurisdiction to render such judgment in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine prevents . . . lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court

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<sup>2</sup>This court granted Holliday leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this cause of action. Doc. 3. A prisoner granted *in forma pauperis* status will have his complaint screened under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to dismiss the complaint prior to service of process if it determines that the claims raised therein are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’ *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).” *Lance v. Dennis*, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199 (2006). Although “*Rooker-Feldman* is a narrow doctrine,” it remains applicable to bar Holliday from proceeding before the court as this case, with respect to any claims challenging a final order issued by a state court, is “‘brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’ 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. [at] 1517.” *Lance*, 546 U.S. at 464, 125 S.Ct. at 1201. Moreover, a § 1983 action is inappropriate either to compel or to appeal a particular course of action by a state court. *Datz v. Kilgore*, 51 F.3d 252, 254 (11th Cir. 1995) (A § 1983 suit arising from alleged erroneous decisions of a state court is merely a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment); *see also Rolleston v. Eldridge*, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988).

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that summary dismissal of any requests seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from Holliday’s second degree sodomy conviction or the 2011 resentencing order issued by Judge Reynolds is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). *See Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd.*, 915 F.2d 636 (11th Cir. 1990); *see also Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

### **B. Attorney David Karn**

Holliday complains that his attorney at resentencing, David Karn, violated his constitutional right to effective representation. Doc. 1 at 3. In accordance with applicable

federal law, this allegation entitles Holliday to no relief from this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An essential element of a § 1983 action is that a person acting under color of state law committed the asserted constitutional deprivation. *Am. Manuf. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan*, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); *Willis v. Univ. Health Serv., Inc.*, 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993).

To state a [viable] claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. . . . [T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach “merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” *Blum v. Yaretsky*, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (quoting *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)). . . . [Consequently,] state action requires **both** an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” **and** that “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); *see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).”

*Am. Manuf.*, 526 U.S. at 49–50 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

The law is well settled that an attorney who represents an individual does not act under color of state law. *Polk Cty. v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); *see also, Mills v. Criminal District Court No. 3*, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[P]rivate attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors and . . . are not subject to suit under section 1983.”). Since the representation by counsel about which Holliday complains was not committed by a person acting under color of state law, the § 1983 claims

presented against defendant Karn lack an arguable basis in law and are therefore subject to summary dismissal as frivolous in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

### **C. The Challenge to Plaintiff's Conviction and Sentence**

Insofar as Holliday presents claims which go to the fundamental legality of his second degree sodomy conviction and resulting sentence on which he is now incarcerated, he is entitled to no relief on these claims. *Edwards v. Balisok*, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

In *Heck*, the Supreme Court held that claims challenging the legality of a prisoner's confinement are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action "unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus" and complaints containing such claims must therefore be dismissed. *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 489. The relevant inquiry is "whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence[.]" *Heck*, 512 U. S. at 487; *Balisok*, 520 U.S. at 648 (inmate's claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief or monetary damages which "necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, [are] not cognizable under § 1983."). The rule of *Heck* is therefore not limited to a request for damages but is equally applicable to an inmate's request for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. *Balisok, supra*. "It is irrelevant that [the plaintiff] disclaims any intention of challenging his conviction [or sentence]; if he makes allegations that are inconsistent with the [action] having been valid, *Heck* kicks in and bars his civil suit." *Okoro v. Callaghan*, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003), citing *Balisok*, 520 U.S. at 646-648.

The law is well settled that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 481; *Balisok*, 520 U.S. at 645 (The “sole remedy in federal court” for a prisoner challenging the constitutionality of incarceration on a sentence of a state court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.); *Okoro*, 324 F.3d at 490 (*Heck* directs that a state inmate “making a collateral attack on [the basis for his incarceration] . . . may not do that in a civil suit, other than a suit under the habeas corpus statute.”). An inmate “cannot seek to accomplish by a section 1983 declaratory judgment what he must accomplish solely through a writ of habeas corpus.” *Jones v. Watkins*, 945 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1996); *Holliday v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrs.*, 75 F.3d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (Under *Heck*, “[t]he [determinative] issue . . . is not the relief sought, but the ground of the challenge.”); *Cook v. Baker, et al.*, 139 F. App’x 167, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (The “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim challenging the basis for or validity of his incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254[.]”). The Supreme Court emphasized “that a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.” *Balisok*, 520 U.S. at 649; *Robinson v. Satz*, 260 F. App’x 209, 212 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n *Wilkinson v. Dotson*, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), the Supreme Court reviewed its prior holdings in this area and summarized that ‘a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent previous invalidation [of his conviction or sentence] )—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.’ *Id.* at 81–82, 125 S.Ct. at 1248.”).

Under the circumstances of this case, *Heck* and its progeny bar Holliday’s use of any federal civil action, other than a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to mount a collateral attack on the validity of his conviction and sentence. 512 U.S. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted [all] available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.”); *Abella v. Rubino*, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (“*Heck* clarifies that *Preiser* is a rule of cognizability, not exhaustion.”). Consequently, the claims presented by Holliday which challenge the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence for second degree sodomy are not cognizable in this cause of action at this time and are therefore subject to summary dismissal in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

### **III. CONCLUSION**

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims against Judge Sibley Reynolds and Attorney David Karn seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to actions which occurred during state criminal proceedings before the Circuit Court of Chilton County, Alabama be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

2. The plaintiff's claims which challenge the validity of his second degree sodomy conviction and resulting sentence imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Chilton County, Alabama be dismissed without prejudice in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as such claims are not properly before the court in the instant cause of action.

3. This case be dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

The plaintiff may file objections to the Recommendation on or before **June 14, 2018**. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which each objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the court.

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations as required by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation. The failure to file written objections will also waive the right of the plaintiff to challenge on appeal the District Court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; *see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.*, 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); *Henley v. Johnson*, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).



DONE this 31st day of May, 2018.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.  
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE